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I.

INTRODUCTION

“Reputation ought to be the perpetual subject of my Thoughts, and
Aim of my Behaviour. How shall I gain a Reputation! How shall I
Spread an Opinion of myself as a Lawyer of distinguished Genius,
Learning, and Virtue.”1 So wrote twenty-four-year-old John Adams in
his diary in 1759.2 He had been a licensed lawyer for just three years at
that time, and had already believed himself to be hounded by “Petty
foggers” and “dirty Dablers in the Law”—unlicensed attorneys who,
Adams claimed, fomented vexatious litigation, for the fees they might
earn.3 Adams believed his embrace of virtue, along with genius and
learning, would gain him a good reputation among the people of
Braintree, Massachusetts.4 That reputation would enable him to succeed
in the practice of law.
Just eleven years later, Adams represented both Captain Thomas
Preston and the eight soldiers tried for murder in the Boston Massacre.5
Though a patriot supporting the cause of the colony of Massachusetts,
Adams willingly defended servants of the British crown. Fellow patriots
and opposing loyalists alike viewed suspiciously nearly every action
Adams took in both trials.6 He helped gain an acquittal for Preston, and
* Aloysius A. Leopold Professor of Law, St. Mary’s University School of Law. He is the
author of the forthcoming book, THE LAWYER’S CONSCIENCE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAWYER
ETHICS (University Press of Kansas forthcoming 2022).
1. JOHN ADAMS, Diary and Autobiography of John Adams, in THE ADAMS PAPERS, at 78 (L.
H. Butterfield ed., Ser. No. 1, 1956).
2. Id. at xiii, 78.
3. Id. at 137-38.
4. Id. at 137.
5. HILLER B. ZOBEL, THE BOSTON MASSACRE 242 (1st ed. 1970); ERIC HINDERAKER,
BOSTON’S MASSACRE 187, 189 (2017) (ebook).
6. ZOBEL, supra note 5, at 242, 247-48. But see HINDERAKER, supra note 5, at 193
(explaining how the townsmen had ample opportunity to “assert themselves by packing Queen
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subsequently as well for six of the eight soldiers in their trial. 7 The two
soldiers convicted were found guilty of manslaughter, not murder.8 Both
received benefit of clergy instead of a death sentence.9 Adams managed
to avoid both the patriotic clamor for blood and loyalist demand for
vindication. His actions, in hindsight, have long been viewed as one of
the most courageous efforts in the history of the American legal
profession.10
Very few lawyers ever find themselves in a position even somewhat
similar to Adams’s. On the rare occasions when they do, the choice can
be between living according to one’s principles or maintaining one’s
practice.11
Lawyers have justified their exercise of immense power in the
American system of government by proclaiming their independence
from both government and community, and by their adherence to norms
of lawyer ethics. When pressed, the legal profession will qualify these
assertions. Independence from government and the community means
relative independence. Lawyers are licensed by the government, but the
bar is largely self-regulated, lessening the pressures a government might
bring to bear on a maverick lawyer.12 Lawyers are also part of the
community in which they practice, and if the community shuns the
lawyer because it finds repellent her clients, her ability to earn a living
practicing law may be fatally compromised.
The consensus view that lawyers are “relatively” independent of
state and society greatly reduces the importance of virtue in the practice
of law. Because lawyers are largely insulated from most of the pressures
state or society might bring to bear, the instances in which a lawyer must
choose between virtue and livelihood are few. Additionally, the
adversary system’s emphasis on zealous and diligent representation
encourages lawyers to consider their role in more liberal than

Street and the courtroom with prospective jurors hostile to Preston and the soldiers [but] again, there
is no evidence that they did so”).
7. HINDERAKER, supra note 5, at 187.
8. Id.
9. See id. at 210.
10. See Law Day Celebrates Legacy of President John Adams, A.B.A. (May 1, 2011),
https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/governmental_legislative_work/publications/governmental_
affairs_periodicals/washingtonletter/2011/may/2011lawday. For example, in 2011, President Barack
Obama declared the annual May 1 Law Day in honor of “The Legacy of John Adams: From Boston
to Guantanamo.” See id.
11. See, e.g., MICHAEL S. ARIENS, THE LAWYER’S CONSCIENCE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
LAWYER ETHICS (forthcoming 2022) (discussing difficulties some lawyers faced in representing
alleged Communists during the early 1950s and civil rights activists in the early 1960s).
12. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
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communitarian terms.13 Only a prosecutor has a duty to seek justice.14
All other practicing lawyers serve as agents of their clients.15 The lawful
goals of the representation are for the client to decide; the lawyer acts to
try to fulfill those goals.16 Whether those goals are socially harmful or
valuable is irrelevant once the lawyer agrees to represent the client.17
When instances of lawyer misconduct become public knowledge,
lamentations follow regarding the power the legal profession exercises.
Lawyers usually respond to a lawyer’s scandal by emphasizing paltry
few miscreants are licensed to practice law. Most lawyers, apologists
argue, conform their conduct to the rules of lawyer ethics.18 They serve
their clients, and by extension the community, competently and
admirably.
As far back as 1786, in response to a series of essays in a Boston
newspaper advocating the abolition of the legal profession, “A Lawyer”
replied in agreement: “That there are abuses in the profession,
productive of private distress and publick uneasiness, I most readily
agree.”19 But the number of lawyers abusing their position was small.
Nearly two centuries later, American Bar Association (“ABA”)
President David Maxwell reached a similar conclusion.20 His 1957
address to ABA members praised the dedication of lawyers to the public
interest.21 He then complained that “the contumacious conduct of an
infinitesimal number of our profession who persist in flouting our
canons of ethics” instead commanded the attention of the public. 22
Whether “A Lawyer” and Maxwell were empirically accurate in their
13. See ARIENS, supra note 11; see also Final Report of the Committee on Code of
Professional Ethics, 33 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 567, 579 (1908).
14. See Final Report of the Committee on Code of Professional Ethics, supra note 13, at 576.
15. See, e.g., James A. Cohen, Lawyer Role, Agency Law, and the Characterization “Officer
of the Court”, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 349, 387 (2000).
16. Id. at 400-01.
17. Id. at 403-04.
18. See David F. Maxwell, The Public View of the Legal Profession, 82 ANN. REP. A.B.A.
362, 362 (1957).
19. Benjamin Russell, Mifcellanies for the Centinel to Honestus, MASS. CENTINEL, April 26,
1786. This was in reply to HONESTUS, OBSERVATIONS ON THE PERNICIOUS PRACTICE OF THE LAW
3, 5-6 (1786) [hereinafter OBSERVATIONS ON THE PERNICIOUS PRACTICE OF THE LAW]. Revised
versions can be found in Honestus, Observations on the Pernicious Practice of the Law, in
SOURCES OF THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LAW OF LAWYERING 45, 45-104 (Michael H.
Hoeflich ed., 2007) [hereinafter SOURCES OF THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LAW OF
LAWYERING], and in Honestus, Observations on the Pernicious Practice of the Law, 13 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 244-302 (1969). The 1819 edition no longer called for the abolition of the legal
profession. See OBSERVATIONS ON THE PERNICIOUS PRACTICE OF THE LAW, supra, at 5-6; SOURCES
OF THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LAW OF LAWYERING, supra, at 51, 53.
20. See Maxwell, supra note 18, at 362.
21. See id.
22. See id.
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assessment, that is, that the number of unethical lawyers was a small part
of the legal profession, is unclear.23 But the legal profession, like every
other human institution, has always comprised the virtuous and the
venal.
From the late eighteenth through most of the twentieth century, the
disbarment of a lawyer was rare.24 This was in significant part due to the
“scandalous” situation that, in many states, the discipline of lawyers was
“practically nonexistent.”25 Other states had a formal system of lawyer
discipline, but it was often “antiquated” and consequently ineffective.26
These were two of the conclusions found in the ABA’s 1970 Clark
Report, named after former Supreme Court Justice Tom Clark. 27 Clark
was the chairman of an ABA Special Committee evaluating the legal
profession’s efforts to discipline lawyer misconduct.28 The scandal
exposed in the Clark Report served as the impetus to act for those
charged with protecting the public from unethical lawyers. Even today,
though nearly all states have adopted modernized and more effective
lawyer disciplinary systems, the percentage of lawyers who are publicly
disciplined each year is around 0.17% of the profession.29 The 2019
ABA Survey on Lawyer Discipline listed 2,308 public disciplinary

23. Cf. JEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN 160, 210-11 (1962) (arguing more
ethical lapses of lawyers exist than ordinarily considered); JEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS:
A SURVEY OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR 52-53, 67, 72-76 (1966) (finding that a significant number
of lawyers do not accept ethical norms of the profession and that more ethical violations exist than
commonly believed within the profession).
24. See, e.g., Report of the Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, 95
ANN. REP. A.B.A. 783, 797-98, 856, 971 (1970) (explaining that, in most jurisdictions, despite the
authority to institute investigations and disciplinary proceedings for attorney misconduct, such
authority was “rarely used” and no disciplinary action was taken).
25. Id. at 797.
26. Id.
27. See id. at 783, 797-98; see also Vincent R. Johnson, Justice Tom C. Clark’s Legacy in the
Field of Legal Ethics, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 33, 33-35 (2004–2005).
28. See Johnson, supra note 27, at 35.
29. See A.B.A. CTR. FOR PRO. RESP. STANDING COMM. ON PRO. REGUL., 2019 SURVEY ON
LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS (S.O.L.D.) CHART III- PART B SANCTIONS IMPOSED 5 (2021),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/soldsurvey/2019-chart3b.pdf; Nicole Black, ABA 2019 Report: Lawyer Demographics, Earnings, Tech
Choices, and More, MYCASE BLOG https://www.mycase.com/blog/aba-2019-report-lawyerdemographics-earnings-tech-choices-and-more (last visited Apr. 23, 2022); see also MICHAEL
ARIENS, LONE STAR LAW: A LEGAL HISTORY OF TEXAS 186 (2011) (noting that by 2006–2007, just
0.4% of all licensed Texas lawyers were publicly disciplined, and only thirty, or 0.038%, were
disbarred); Debra Moss Curtis & Billie Jo Kaufman, A Public View of Attorney Discipline in
Florida: Statistics, Commentary, and Analysis of Disciplinary Actions Against Licensed Attorneys
in the State of Florida from 1988-2002, 28 NOVA L. REV. 669, 689 (2004) (finding that just 0.30%
of all licensed Florida lawyers were disciplined in 2003).
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actions of lawyers, of whom only 565 (389 involuntarily, and 176
voluntarily) were disbarred.30
Given how few lawyers are the subject of public discipline, either
“A Lawyer” and Maxwell were right, or the legal profession is not
effectively disciplining lawyers for misconduct. Whatever the actual
state of actionable lawyer misconduct, the legal profession spends a
great deal of time and effort to assure the public that it takes seriously its
responsibility to protect the public from unprofessional lawyer conduct.
It does so most prominently through amending and supplementing the
rules of professional conduct.31
Part II describes the relevant changes in the goals of the rules of
ethics applicable to lawyers from the ABA’s 1908 Canons of
Professional Ethics, through its 1983 Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.32 Part III evaluates the recent efforts in Connecticut, New
York, and Pennsylvania to proscribe discriminatory and harassing
conduct by lawyers against protected persons, and calls on their
respective Disciplinary Counsels to amend their ethics rules
accordingly.33
These efforts are a response to the ABA’s adoption in 2016 of
Model Rule 8.4(g), an anti-discrimination (and anti-harassment) rule.
Rule 8.4(g) declares it unprofessional conduct for a lawyer to “engage in
conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is harassment
or discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin,
ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital
status or socioeconomic status in conduct related to the practice of
law.”34
Pennsylvania’s 2020 effort to amend its anti-discrimination rule in
light of (though not a copy of) Model Rule 8.4(g) was held
unconstitutional on free speech viewpoint-discrimination grounds later
that year.35 The District Court’s decision has crystallized the issue of the
constitutionality of the various anti-discrimination ethics provisions

30. A.B.A. CTR. FOR PRO. RESP. STANDING COMM. ON PRO. REGUL., supra note 29, at 5. The
survey lacked information from California, Massachusetts, New Jersey, the First and Third
Departments of New York, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia. Id. at 6.
31. See,
e.g.,
Model
Rules
of
Professional
Conduct,
A.B.A.,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_profe
ssional_conduct (last visited Apr. 23, 2022) (showing the recent changes to the Model Rules, with
the most recent being in August 2020).
32. See infra Part II.
33. See infra Part III.B.
34. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
35. Greenberg v. Haggerty, 491 F. Supp. 3d 12, 27, 29, 30, 33 (E.D. Pa. 2020).
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adopted across states.36 Pennsylvania responded with an amended rule.37
Connecticut recently adopted an amended anti-discrimination
provision.38 A Committee of the New York State Bar Association has
worked on amending its anti-discrimination ethics rule for over half a
decade.39 This Article will look at whether these efforts meet Supreme
Court precedent regarding impermissible viewpoint-discrimination
under the First Amendment.40
II.

THE GOAL OF THE RULES OF ETHICS

In 1907, Thomas Hubbard, chairman of the ABA’s Committee on
Code of Professional Ethics, informed its members of the Committee’s
progress.41 He quoted from a letter sent to him by Supreme Court Justice
David Brewer regarding the structure of the Code.42 Brewer urged the
ABA to create an ethics code consisting of two parts. One part listed “a
body of rules to be given operative and binding force.”43 The second part
was “a canon of ethics, which shall discuss the duties of lawyers under
the various conditions of professional action.”44 The body of rules
constituted minimum standards in the practice of law. The canons of
ethics were to list “ethical considerations which should ever control the
action of the profession.”45 The Committee followed Brewer’s
suggestion: it drafted a distinct set of thirty-two canons comprising
Brewer’s “ethical considerations,” followed by an Oath of Admission

36. See generally id. at 28 (“Although the final version of Rule 8.4(g) does not include this
comment, the fatal language, ‘by words . . . manifest bias or prejudice,’ remains. . . . That this
language . . . remained in the final version of Rule 8.4(g) illustrates the Rule’s broad and chilling
implications.”).
37. See Supreme Court Amends Harassment Provisions of Rule 8.4, DISCIPLINARY BD. SUP.
CT.
PA.
(July
27,
2021),
https://www.padisciplinaryboard.org/news-media/newsarticle/1439/supreme-court-amends-harassment-provisions-of-rule-84; see also Greenberg, 491 F.
Supp. 3d at 32.
38. See CONN. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2021).
39. Memorandum from the N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Standards Att’y Conduct,
COSAC Proposal to Amend Rule 8.4(g) of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct 4-6 (June
4, 2021), https://nysba.org/app/uploads/2021/03/COSAC-Report-on-Rule-8.4g-FINAL-Approvedby-HOD-June-12-2021.pdf [hereinafter N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Memorandum].
40. See infra Part III.B.1.
41. Transactions of the Thirtieth Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, 31 ANN.
REP. A.B.A 3, 61, 64 (1907).
42. Id. at 62-63.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 63.
45. Id.
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listing seven “rules.”46 In 1908, the ABA adopted the Code of
Professional Ethics.47
One example to help understand the different purposes of the two
parts of the 1908 ABA Code is the lawyer’s duty not to divulge a client’s
confidences.48 That duty is found as the fifth of seven statements every
lawyer is sworn by oath to obey.49 The failure to keep true to one’s oath
was intended to lead to disbarment.50 None of the thirty-two canons
adopted by the ABA concerned the lawyer’s duty to maintain the
confidences of a client. That was because the purpose of the canons was
to offer “ethical considerations.”51 Such considerations guided the
lawyer faced with two or more choices in how to act. The duty to keep a
client’s confidences was clear; it did not permit the lawyer any
discretion to act.52
The ABA did not revisit the issue of the ethical standards of the
legal profession until 1964, when a Special Committee, known as the
Wright Committee, began a six-year effort culminating in the adoption
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (1969).53
The Code of Professional Responsibility organized the standards of
ethical behavior in three parts. First, it listed nine black-letter canons,
which spoke more and less generally about a topic of lawyer ethics.54
46. Id.; see Transactions of the Thirty-First Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association,
33 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 3, 57-59 (1908).
47. Transactions of the Thirty-First Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, supra
note 46, at 85-86.
48. Final Report of the Committee on Code of Professional Ethics, supra note 13, at 577.
49. Id. at 585 (“I will maintain the confidence and preserve inviolate the secrets of my
client.”).
50. Id. at 584-85.
51. Transactions of the Thirtieth Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, supra note
41, at 63.
52. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT 6.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). The 1908 Code did not
consider possible exceptions to this duty, such as disclosing a confidence when the lawyer believed
it necessary to prevent the death of a third person. See Transactions of the Thirty-First Annual
Meeting of the American Bar Association, supra note 46, at 73; see also COLIN M. LEONARD ET AL.,
PLENARY
THREE:
CANDOR
BEFORE
THE
TRIBUNAL
1-2
(2019),
https://nysba.org/NYSBA/Sections/Commercial%20Federal%20Litigation/ComFed%20Display%2
0Tabs/Events/2019/Spring%20Meeting%20Materials/Candor%20Before%20the%20Tribunal.pdf.
53. See Proceedings of the 1969 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 94 ANN. REP.
A.B.A. 378, 389-92 (1969) (showing that, though there was some disagreement, the House
eventually adopted the code as proposed); see also Michael S. Ariens, American Legal Ethics in an
Age of Anxiety, 40 ST. MARY’S L.J. 343, 433-43 (2008) [hereinafter American Legal Ethics in an
Age of Anxiety] (discussing the history of the Code); Michael Ariens, The Last Hurrah: The Kutak
Commission and the End of Optimism, 49 CREIGHTON L. REV. 689, 691 (2016) [hereinafter The
Last Hurrah].
54. See American Legal Ethics in an Age of Anxiety, supra note 53, at 439; see also Report of
the Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards, 94 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 729, 734, 738,
756, 759, 763, 772, 774, 791, 794 (1969); The Last Hurrah, supra note 53, at 700.
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For example, Canon 7 declared, “A lawyer should represent a client
zealously within the bounds of the law.” 55 Within each canon, the
drafters included ethical considerations and, finally, disciplinary rules.
“The [e]thical [c]onsiderations are aspirational in character and represent
the objectives toward which every member of the profession should
strive. They constitute a body of principles upon which the lawyer can
rely for guidance in many specific situations.”56 The disciplinary rules
were “unlike” the ethical considerations because the former were
“mandatory in character.”57
The ABA’s 1969 Code had a brief life. Though states eagerly
adopted the Code initially, by 1977 the ABA called for a new statement
of the ethical responsibilities of lawyers.58 The ABA created another
Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards, known after its
chairman Robert Kutak, as “the Kutak Commission,” to draft a new code
of ethics.59
The Kutak Commission quickly decided to dismantle the tripartite
structure of the 1969 Code, and replace it with a “‘Restatement’-like”
structure.60 The Commission intended to declare a series of
“black-letter” rules followed by explanatory commentary.61 The rules
stated the minimum standard of conduct required of a lawyer. A
violation of that standard subjected the lawyer to discipline. In early
1982, after the Kutak Commission issued its Proposed Final Draft, the
ABA House of Delegates formally approved of the Kutak Commission’s
“Restatement” approach.62 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
were finally approved by the ABA at its August 1983 annual meeting.63
The two succeeding ethics reform efforts of the ABA—Ethics 2000
and Ethics 20/20—have worked only at the margins of the Model Rules.
Most importantly, those efforts kept unaltered the Restatement policy

55. Report of the Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards, supra note 54, at
774.
56. CODE OF PRO. RESP. pmbl. & preliminary statement (AM. BAR ASS’N 1969), reprinted in
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS 1, 1-2 (1969).
57. Id.
58. William B. Spann, Jr., The Legal Profession Needs a New Code of Ethics, BAR LEADER,
Nov.–Dec. 1977, at 2, 2-3. Spann was serving as American Bar Association President. Id.
59. See The Last Hurrah, supra note 53, at 689-92 (summarizing the history of development
of Model Rules of Professional Conduct in the late 1970s and early 1980s).
60. See id. at 700.
61. See id. (noting initial decisions of the Kutak Commission).
62. See Proceedings of the 1982 Midyear Meeting of the House of Delegates, 107 ANN. REP.
A.B.A. 273, 301 (1982).
63. Proceedings of the 1983 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 108 ANN. REP.
A.B.A. 763, 766-88 (1983).
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that the Model Rules serve as minimum standards of professional
conduct.
The most important instance in the Model Rules for which the
above statement is untrue is Model Rule 6.1. The initial efforts of the
Kutak Commission included a provision mandating lawyers to annually
perform a number of hours of pro bono legal services.64 After substantial
criticism, the Commission eliminated the mandatory aspect of public
interest pro bono.65 It kept Rule 6.1, and altered the duty with the plea,
“a ‘lawyer shall render unpaid public interest legal service.’”66
III.

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION, ETHICS RULES, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
A. Introduction

Model Rule 8.4(g) was adopted by the ABA in 2016.67 It states it is
misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in conduct that the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know is harassment or discrimination on the basis of
race, sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual
orientation, gender identity, marital status or socioeconomic status in
conduct related to the practice of law.”68 The rule was the culmination of
a quarter-century-long effort to sanction discriminatory conduct in the
legal profession.69 In fact, twenty-five jurisdictions had already adopted
anti-discrimination provisions, making it an ethical violation for a
lawyer to harass or discriminate against another, before the ABA ever
acted.70 Even before these states adopted their anti-discrimination
provisions, they used other standards to discipline lawyers for abusive

64. See The Last Hurrah, supra note 53, at 708, 715 (noting mandatory pro bono was
included in both the 1979 “working draft” and 1980 Discussion Draft, but not in the Proposed Final
Draft or later).
65. Id. at 717-18.
66. Id. at 709.
67. See, e.g., Michael Ariens, Model Rule 8.4(g) and the Profession’s Core Values Problem,
11 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 180, 216 (2021) (recounting history and
adoption of Model Rule 8.4(g)).
68. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
69. See Ariens, supra note 67, at 215 (explaining that Comment [2] served as the exclusive
authority on the issue of sanctioning a lawyer’s discriminatory or harassing behavior, for fifteen
years); see also id. at 210-16 (noting the absence of debate and vote at the culmination of the
fifteen-year gap in authority on the issue).
70. See id. at 220 n.264 (citing authorities).
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verbal conduct that evidenced discrimination on the basis of race and
gender.71
Since 2016, no published disciplinary case involving discriminatory
speech has appeared. Four states, Vermont (2017),72 Maine (2019),73
New Mexico (2020),74 and Pennsylvania (2020),75 have adopted an
anti-discrimination rule. Pennsylvania’s was the subject of an immediate
and successful pre-enforcement challenge in Greenberg v. Haggerty.76
Both before and since the district court’s decision in Greenberg, bar
associations and other organizations tied to a state’s legal profession
have wrestled with anti-discrimination ethics provisions. This Subpart
calls in three states, Pennsylvania, New York, and Connecticut,77 to draft
ethics provisions that sanction discrimination and harassment by lawyers
and which meet the demands of the Constitution.
B. Amending State Anti-Discrimination Lawyer Ethics Rules
1. Greenberg and Pennsylvania’s Amended Rule 8.4(g)
In Greenberg v. Haggerty, Pennsylvania’s anti-discrimination Rule
8.4(g)
was
held
unconstitutional
on
First
Amendment
viewpoint-discrimination grounds.78 Its rule declared it misconduct for a
lawyer to, “in the practice of law, by words or conduct, knowingly
manifest bias or prejudice, or engage in harassment or discrimination”
on the basis of eleven different grounds, including race, sex, and
religion.79 Pennsylvania subsequently dropped its appeal. In July 2021,

71. See id. at 214 (noting some ethics code provisions prohibiting discrimination on account
of race, gender, ethnicity or other category, and others discouraging or prohibiting lawyer
manifestations of bias or prejudice, in addition to their prohibition on discrimination); see also In re
Schiff, 599 N.Y.S.2d 242, 242-43 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (per curiam) (“While representing a
plaintiff at a deposition in a personal injury action, respondent was unduly intimidating and abusive
toward the defendant’s counsel, and he directed vulgar, obscene and sexist epithets toward her
anatomy and gender. Respondent’s conduct is inexcusable and intolerable.”).
72. Ariens, supra note 67, at 221 & n.265.
73. Id. at 221 & n.266.
74. Id. at 221 & n.267.
75. Id. at 221 & n.268.
76. 491 F. Supp. 3d 12, 27, 29, 30, 32-33 (E.D. Pa. 2020).
77. For a discussion on how Nebraska is beginning a similar process to consider amending its
rule analogous to Model Rule 8.4(g), see Neb. State Bar Ass’n, Notice of Comment Period 1-3,
https://www.clsreligiousfreedom.org/sites/default/files/site_files/ABA%208.4(g)/NE%20Notice%2
0of%20omment%20Period%203-508.4RuleAmds.pdf?_ga=2.258508041.2069473406.16445138821614642460.1644513882 (last visited Apr. 23, 2022).
78. 491 F. Supp. 3d at 32-33.
79. Id. at 16 (quoting original PA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2020)); see also id. at
17.

2022]

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ETHICS RULES AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION

511

the
Pennsylvania
Supreme
Court
adopted an
amended
anti-discrimination Rule 8.4(g).80 It declared it was misconduct for a
lawyer to:
[I]n the practice of law, knowingly engage in conduct
constituting harassment or discrimination based upon race, sex,
gender identity or expression, religion, national origin, ethnicity,
disability, age, sexual orientation, marital status, or
socioeconomic status. This paragraph does not limit the ability
of a lawyer to accept, decline or withdraw from a representation
in accordance with Rule 1.16. This paragraph does not preclude
advice or advocacy consistent with these [r]ules.81
The amended rule altered the original version in several ways. First,
it deleted “by words or,” before “conduct,” thus limiting the rule’s text
to conduct.82 Second, it re-structured its scienter requirement. It deleted
the phrase “knowingly manifest bias or prejudice, or engage in” before
“harassment.”83 It moved the scienter requirement to modify the verb
“engage.” It thus read, “knowingly engage in conduct.”84 Third, it
limited the rule’s applicability to “conduct constituting harassment or
discrimination,” and deleted the clause that defined harassment and
discrimination in light of federal, state, and local law.85 As a result, the
amended rule was directed at a lawyer who “knowingly engage[d] in
conduct constituting harassment and discrimination.”86 The same eleven
categories of prohibited discriminatory or harassing conduct remained as
before.
In addition to amending Rule 8.4(g), the Court amended the
comments to Rule 8.4.87 It did so in two important respects. First, it
defined the practice of law to include interactions with others “in
connection with representation of a client,” “operating or managing a
law firm,” and participation in a number of bar-related activities, but not
any communication “outside th[os]e contexts.”88 Second, it further

80.
81.
82.
83.

See Supreme Court Amends Harassment Provisions of Rule 8.4, supra note 37.
PA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2021).
Compare id., with PA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2020).
Compare PA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2021), with PA. RULES
CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2020).
84. Compare PA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2021), with PA. RULES
CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2020).
85. Compare PA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2021), with PA. RULES
CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2020).
86. Compare PA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2021), with PA. RULES
CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2020).
87. Greenberg v. Haggerty, 491 F. Supp. 3d 12, 16-17 (E.D. Pa. 2020).
88. PA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) cmt. 3 (2021).
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defined harassment in Comment [4] and discrimination in Comment
[5].89
Harassment was defined to include “conduct that is intended to
intimidate, denigrate or show hostility or aversion toward a person on
any of the bases listed in paragraph (g).”90 Comment [4] included a
second sentence banning sexual harassment, including by verbal
conduct, that is, speech (“requests for sexual favors”).91
Discrimination was defined in Comment [5] as:
[C]onduct that a lawyer knows or manifests an intention: to treat a
person as inferior based on one or more of the characteristics listed in
paragraph (g); to disregard relevant considerations of individual
characteristics or merit because of one or more of the characteristics;
or to attempt to cause interference with the fair administration of
justice based on one or more of the listed characteristics.92

By deleting the specific mention in original Rule 8.4(g) that a
lawyer’s “words” could trigger discipline, Pennsylvania’s amended Rule
8.4(g) appears to seek to avoid a First Amendment speech challenge. In
both Comment [4] and Comment [5], the Court expanded the definitions
of harassment and discrimination, respectively, which enveloped some
speech within its understanding of conduct. That limits the effectiveness
of the Court’s apparent intentions.
Comment [4] defines harassment to include “conduct that is
intended to intimidate, denigrate or show hostility or aversion toward a
person.”93 Government prohibitions on speech that intends to intimidate
is likely constitutional.94 In Virginia v. Black, the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional Virginia’s ban on cross-burning.95 In doing so, however,
the Court declared that “a State, consistent with the First Amendment,
may ban cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate.” 96
Virginia’s statute was unconstitutional because it made burning any
cross prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate.97 All of the
Justices, other than Justice Thomas, concluded the defendants’ conduct
in burning a cross was “expressive conduct,” making Virginia’s ban

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

See id. cmts. 4, 5.
Id. cmt. 4.
Id.
Id. cmt. 5.
Id.
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 348, 360, 362-63, 365 (2003).
See id. at 347-48.
Id. at 347.
See id. at 367.
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subject to First Amendment analysis. 98 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court’s use of “intimidate” appears to have met the strictures of Virginia
v. Black.
Ordinarily, one “denigrates” a person, institution, or other object
through speech, not conduct.99 One may intend to denigrate another
through racist speech. In the 1952 case of Beauharnais v. Illinois, the
Supreme Court held constitutional an Illinois statute that criminally
punished a person for speech that “portrays depravity, criminality
unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color,
creed or religion.”100 In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Supreme
Court held constitutional a criminal ban on “fighting words,”
“face-to-face words plainly likely to cause a breach of the peace by the
addressee.”101 Speech that sexually objectifies the listener is also
denigrating.102 Sexual harassment through verbal conduct may be
prohibited by the government without raising any First Amendment
concerns.103
One difficulty with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s definition of
“conduct . . . intended to . . . denigrate or show hostility or aversion
toward a person”104 is the minimal value of Beauharnais and
Chaplinsky. Though never formally overruled, Beauharnais is
effectively a dead letter.105 The fighting words doctrine enunciated in
Chaplinsky remains in existence, but as the Montana Supreme Court
recently noted, “[T]he United States Supreme Court has never again
upheld a conviction based on the ‘fighting words’ categorical
exception.”106 The Court’s decision in Cohen v. California protecting
“offensive” speech also limits the maneuvering room to prohibit some
98. Id. at 358; id. at 368 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 388 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I
believe that the majority errs in imputing an expressive component to the activity in question . . . . In
my view, whatever expressive value cross burning has, the legislature simply wrote it out by
banning only intimidating conduct undertaken by a particular means.”).
99. See Supreme Court Amends Harassment Provisions of Rule 8.4, supra note 37.
100. 343 U.S. 250, 251 (1952).
101. 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942).
102. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 493 (2020) (“[S]exual
harassment includes but is not limited to sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature that is unwelcome.”) (emphasis added).
103. See id. (“Courts have consistently upheld professional conduct rules similar to Rule 8.4(g)
against First Amendment Challenge.”).
104. PA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) cmt. 4 (2021).
105. See Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll. v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d 668, 672 (7th Cir.
2008) (“Anyway, though Beauharnais v. Illinois has never been overruled, no one thinks the First
Amendment would today be interpreted to allow group defamation to be prohibited.”) (citation
omitted).
106. State v. Dugan, 303 P.3d 755, 762 (Mont. 2013); see also Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S.
518, 523 (1972) (narrowing the application of the fighting words doctrine).
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vile lawyer speech.107 The greater difficulty facing the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court is the recent decision in Matal v. Tam.108
Simon Tam sought to register the trademark “The Slants,” the name
of a musical group, with the Patent and Trademark Office.109 It refused
to do so because the federal Lanham Act banned the registration of any
trademark that might disparage any person.110 As noted at the beginning
of Justice Alito’s opinion, “‘Slants’ is a derogatory term for persons of
Asian descent, and members of the band are Asian-Americans. But the
band members believe that by taking that slur as the name of their group,
they will help to ‘reclaim’ the term and drain its denigrating force.”111
Though fractured in their reasons, the members of the Court
unanimously (with Justice Gorsuch not participating) held the
disparagement clause of the Lanham Act was unconstitutional on
viewpoint-discrimination grounds.112
The following year, the Court held, in National Institute of Family
and Life Advocates v. Becerra, that professional speech is not a category
of speech subject to less stringent First Amendment evaluation than
ordinary speech.113 Becerra makes it much more likely lawyers will file
First Amendment challenges to ethics rules.
Pennsylvania is on shakier ground in declaring as harassment
“conduct that is intended to . . . show hostility or aversion to a
person.”114 Expressive or verbal conduct by a lawyer in such a situation
is easy to imagine. A lawyer represents a client alleging racial
discrimination in housing, and learns in discovery the defendant’s
lawyer owns a Ku Klux Klan robe. The lawyer publicly speaks of her
disgust that a lawyer would own such an item. The lawyer’s verbal
conduct demonstrates hostility to a person, and thus appears to meet the
Comment [4]’s definition of harassment.
Explanatory Comment [5] on discrimination creates other
interpretive problems: What is an “intention” to treat a person as an
“inferior” through conduct, particularly expressive conduct?115 A
107. See generally 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding “Fuck the Draft” offensive but wholly
protected speech); see also Gooding, 405 U.S. at 520. But see Dugan, 303 P.3d at 762 (“The Court
clarified in Cohen v. California that words must be directed at a specific person and likely to
provoke a violent response from the hearer to constitute protected ‘fighting words.’”) (citation
omitted).
108. 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017); see Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2303 (2019).
109. Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1754.
110. Id. at 1751.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1765-66.
113. 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371-72 (2018).
114. PA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4 (2021).
115. Id. cmt. 5.
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continuing legal education speaker urges abolition of the rules of
professional conduct in favor of a market-based approach tied to legal
malpractice. Vigorous debate opposing this idea might include one or
more statements along the lines of, “Are you an idiot?” Does such a
comment, which can be interpreted as attacking a person on the basis of
“disability,” (or otherwise if the speaker and listener are of differing
races, religions, ethnicities and so on) subject the lawyer to discipline?
Zachary Greenberg has sued again in federal court, alleging
amended Rule 8.4(g) is unconstitutional.116 Amended Rule 8.4(g) runs
into trouble not in its text, but in the explanatory comments that more
broadly state that some kinds of verbal conduct are impermissible.
2. Amending New York’s Rule 8.4(g)
On June 4, 2021, the New York State Bar Association’s Committee
on Standards of Attorney Conduct (“COSAC”) issued its report on its
proposal to amend New York’s Rule 8.4(g).117 COSAC’s proposal was
intentionally narrower than Model Rule 8.4(g).
COSAC’s proposal, Proposed Rule 8.4(g)(1), bans “unlawful
discrimination.”118 Making only unlawful discrimination subject to
discipline appears to solve any First Amendment problem. Proposed
Comment [5F], however, states, “A trial judge’s finding that peremptory
challenges were exercised on a discriminatory basis does not alone
establish a violation of this rule.”119 It is difficult to square these
propositions. Why is a lawyer who has been found by a governmental
actor to have engaged in discrimination not subject to discipline for that
discriminatory act alone? The Batson rule, after all, is over thirty-five
years old, and well-settled law.120 Because COSAC’s proposed rule
prohibiting unlawful discrimination appears limited to non-expressive
conduct, whether the government engaged in viewpoint-discrimination
in banning only certain kinds of proscribable speech may not be at
issue.121 A lawyer found to have engaged in discrimination in making
peremptory challenges is engaged in both speech and conduct.122

116. Greenberg v. Haggerty, 491 F. Supp. 3d 12, 16-17 (E.D. Pa. 2020).
117. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Memorandum, supra note 39, at 1. The Committee on Standards of
Attorney Conduct’s (“COSAC”) is one of three proposals to amend New York’s Rule 8.4(g). See id.
at A-31. Because COSAC has written the narrowest of the three proposals, I focus on it.
118. Id. at 1.
119. Id. at 3.
120. See generally Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding unconstitutional racially
discriminatory peremptory challenge to jury venire member by prosecutor).
121. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992).
122. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 3. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
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Proposed Rule 8.4(g)(2) declares it unprofessional conduct for a
lawyer to engage in “harassment, whether or not unlawful.”123 Like the
unlawful discrimination provision, a lawyer would be subject to
discipline for harassment “on the basis of” any one of fourteen
categories.124 The scienter provision was also the same: a lawyer was
subject to discipline if the lawyer knew, or reasonably should have
known, the conduct, including verbal conduct, was harassment.125
Proposed Rule 8.4(g)(3) defines harassment as conduct that is “a.
directed at an individual or specific individuals in one or more of the
protected categories; b. severe or pervasive; and c. either (i) unwelcome
physical contact or (ii) derogatory or demeaning verbal conduct.”126
COSAC’s definition comes close to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC”) definition of harassment in the
employment context. In that context, if a reasonable person would find
the conduct, including verbal conduct, intimidating, hostile, or abusive,
it has reached the level of severe and pervasive harassment.127 The
speech issues are twofold: First, can the EEOC’s definition of
harassment apply to verbal conduct outside of the employment context;
and, second, is the adoption of the phrasing “derogatory or demeaning”
in the second part of the third element, constitutionally relevant? Insofar
as it limits speech that is offensive, it is. Whether harassment at a bar
association meeting and harassment in the workplace are equivalent in
law is uncertain.
COSAC adopts EEOC language in Comment [5C], which declared,
“Petty slights, minor indignities and discourteous conduct without more
do not constitute harassment.”128 The problem with this language is its
negative implication: if speech is more than a “petty” slight, or greater
than a “minor” indignity, or constitutes “discourteous” conduct
(including verbal conduct), such speech may constitute harassment. This
would likely sweep too far.
Proposed Rule 8.4(g)(4)(b) protects a lawyer’s ability to “express
views on matters of public concern in the context of teaching, public
speeches, continuing legal education programs, or other forms of public
123. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Memorandum, supra note 39, at 2.
124. See id. at 2, 7, 17 (noting COSAC intentionally did not include socioeconomic status as
one of the protected categories).
125. Id. at 7, 17-18.
126. Id. at 2.
127. Harassment,
U.S.
E QUAL
E MP .
OPPORTUNITY
COMM’ N,
https://www.eeoc.gov/harassment (last visited Apr. 23, 2022).
128. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Memorandum, supra note 39, at 3; see Harassment, supra note 127
(“Petty slights, annoyances, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not rise to the
level of illegality.”).
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advocacy or education, or in any other form of written or oral speech
protected by the United States Constitution or the New York State
Constitution . . . .”129
Connecticut made a similar statement in its Comment [6]. 130 It is
unclear what either is attempting to signal by such a statement. As a
matter of constitutional law, these statements are both axiomatic and
banal. The issue is whether the anti-discrimination rules impinge on free
speech rights of lawyers, or have a chilling effect on constitutional
speech by lawyers.
3. Amending Connecticut’s Rule 8.4(7)
Connecticut’s modified Rule 8.4(7) was made effective January 1,
2022.131 It is the subject of a lawsuit raising First Amendment claims.132
As amended, Connecticut Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(7)
states:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: . . . (7) Engage in conduct
that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is harassment or
discrimination on the basis of race, color, ancestry, sex, pregnancy,
religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, status as a veteran, age,
sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression or marital status
in conduct related to the practice of law. This paragraph does not limit
the ability of a lawyer to accept, decline or withdraw from a
representation, or to provide advice, assistance or advocacy consistent
with these rules.133

Connecticut Rule 8.4(7) avoids using the phrases “by words,” or
“verbal conduct.”134 By focusing on conduct that discriminates or
harasses, the amended rule avoids many of the problems of
Pennsylvania’s original Rule 8.4(g). Like Pennsylvania’s amended rule
8.4(g), Connecticut’s amended rule is vulnerable to constitutional
challenge in light of the comments that attended the rule change.
Connecticut added six comments to assist in the rule’s
interpretation. The first, Comment [3], states in part, “Discrimination
includes harmful verbal or physical conduct directed at an individual or
129. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Memorandum, supra note 39, at 2.
130. CONN. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(7) (2021) (“A lawyer’s conduct does not violate
paragraph (7) when the conduct in question is protected under the first amendment of the United
States constitution or article first, § 4 of the Connecticut constitution.”).
131. See id.
132. See id.; see also Complaint at 3, Cerame & Moynahan v. Bowler, No. 3:21-cv-01502 (D.
Conn. Nov. 10, 2021).
133. CONN. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(7) (2021).
134. Id.
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individuals that manifests bias or prejudice on the basis of one or more
of the protected categories.”135 If one stitches together the rule’s text
with this comment, it reads to the effect that a lawyer engages in
discrimination when the lawyer reasonably should know the speech
manifests bias or prejudice against a person or persons who are in one or
more of the protected categories.
The use of the phrase “manifests bias or prejudice” in Comment [3]
echoes language from Pennsylvania’s original anti-discrimination rule.
That language was first used in the Model Rules when it was added to
Comment [2] to ABA Model Rule 8.4 in 1998.136 Comment [2] took that
phrase from Canon 3B(5) of the ABA’s 1990 Model Code of Judicial
Conduct, which continued as Rule 2.3(C) of the ABA’s 2007 Model
Code of Judicial Conduct.137 Comment [2] of the 2007 Model Code of
Judicial Conduct stated a judge manifested bias or prejudice through
“epithets; slurs; demeaning nicknames; negative stereotyping; attempted
humor based upon stereotypes; threatening, intimidating, or hostile acts;
suggestions of connections between race, ethnicity, or nationality and
crime; and irrelevant references to personal characteristics.”138
As applied to judges, the ban on manifesting bias or prejudice
makes sense. Lawyers who demean witnesses, opposing parties, other
lawyers, court personnel, and others, should not be praised. Their
condemnatory speech, however, is fully protected under Supreme Court
precedent.139
Comment [4] states, “Harassment includes severe or pervasive
derogatory or demeaning verbal or physical conduct.”140 This is similar
to COSAC’s definition of harassment in Proposed Rule
8.4(g)(3)(c)(ii).141 Again, this definition comes close to the EEOC’s
definition of harassment in the employment context. As with COSAC’s
Proposed Rule, the issues are whether harassment as defined in the
workplace also applies in other contexts. Additionally, whether the
phrasing “derogatory or demeaning” constitutes offensive but protected
speech is uncertain. However, it appears Connecticut has a stronger case
in defending its definition of harassment than discrimination.

135. Id. cmt. 3.
136. See Report of the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 123
ANN. REP. A.B.A. 81, 81 (1998).
137. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT 2.3(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010).
138. Id. cmt. 2.
139. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 23-24, 26 (1971).
140. CONN. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(7) (2021).
141. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Memorandum, supra note 39, at 17, A-4.
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CONCLUSION

Can a person’s beliefs be changed (corrected?) under the threat of
sanction? When voluntary state bar associations began crafting codes of
ethics for their members, some lawyers pushed back, arguing a code of
ethics would have no impact on the behavior of those shysters and
pettifoggers who disgraced the profession.142 The ABA rejected that
view when it adopted an oath and thirty-two canons of ethics.143 The
ABA successfully promoted the code of ethics; most state bar
associations had adopted it by 1924.144
The largely hortatory 1908 ABA Code served an important
purpose: it provided the foundational materials to the lawyer who wished
to educate himself about how to practice law in an ethical fashion.145
This was crucial in large part because the legal profession never
constituted simply an elite. Legal elites desperately tried to keep the law
“pure” through making it more difficult to gain a license admitting the
applicant to the bar.146 They succeeded only in fits and starts, and failed
to restrict admission to the extent medical doctors did.147 This was
largely for the nation’s good. Its lawyers did not comprise a small group
relatively unsullied by the frailties that all of us carry.
When the 1908 Code was supplanted by the ABA’s 1969 Code of
Professional Responsibility, that educative function remained in the
Ethical Considerations of the Code. The swift displacement of the code
by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 1983 marked an
important change in the purpose of a code of ethics: the Model Rules
were intended to serve as “thou-shall-nots,” a Restatement of what was
prohibited.148 They were educative only in rare circumstances, such as
Rule 6.1, which encouraged lawyers to meet their “Voluntary Pro Bono
Publico Service.”149 The “Rules of Professional Conduct” focused on the
142. Report of the Standing Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances, 49 ANN. REP.
A.B.A. 466, 473 (1924).
143. See Transactions of the Thirtieth Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, supra
note 41, at 86 (adopting oath and canons).
144. See Report of the Standing Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances, supra note
142, at 467-68.
145. See Final Report of the Committee on Code of Professional Ethics, supra note 13, at 569,
574-75.
146. See, e.g., id. at 584 n.1 (“The oaths administered on admission to the Bar in all of the
other [sixteen] states [listed] require the observance of the highest moral principle in the practice of
the profession, but the duties of the lawyer are not as specifically defined by law as in the states
named.”).
147. See Report of the Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, supra
note 24, at 912-13, 983.
148. See The Last Hurrah, supra note 53, at 700, 714.
149. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 6.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
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duty of a lawyer to meet a minimum threshold of conduct. Failure to do
so subjected the lawyer to discipline. Lawyers, then, were given the
signal to look at the bare minimum standard of professional conduct.
Model Rule 8.4(g) meets the standards of a disciplinary rule. If a
lawyer engages in certain types of conduct, that lawyer may be
disciplined. In action, however, it has done little. Its constitutionality is
uncertain.150 Though more than half of state lawyer regulatory bodies
have adopted a version of Model Rule 8.4(g), it is unused other than for
its in terrorem effect.
One of COSAC’s policy justifications for amending New York’s
anti-discrimination rule rings as true as ever: “[T]he legal profession
should aspire to be more diverse, more equitable, and more inclusive of
its own members.”151 Inclusion, of course, works in a variety of ways.
One such way is to acknowledge that stark differences among lawyers
have and will always exist.

150. See supra Part III.A–B; see also supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
151. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Memorandum, supra note 39, at 5.

